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THE OLD AGE AND SENILITY
OF THE CITY
GEORGE D. SImos*
An analysis of the evolution of Federal programs as geriatric
tools to prevent the obsolescence of American cities.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cities everywhere are dynamically changing organisms, responding
to stimuli, adapting to changes in circumstances, and increasingly sub-
ject to urban illness and disease as they grow older. On a massive, im-
personal scale, the life-cycle of the city may roughly be compared to
that of a man-formative growth and development; maturity and
strength, and the peak of physical capability; age and decay; and,
finally, senility or death.
In the great cities of history, this life-cycle spanned centuries or
even millenia. The major European cities have existed in relatively
stable cultures and have proved slow to respond to change.
In the United States, however, the life-span of cities as healthy,
efficient organisms is being foreshortened at an accelerating pace, even
as science and technology almost daily devise new ways to lengthen
the life of man.
The processes of change hit hardest at American cities, hastening a
decay leading to functional obsolescence.
Unlike historical or foreign cities, American cities, almost from
their founding, have been confronted with tremendous pressures re-
quiring constant adaptation for continued health.
They have sheltered massive, periodic waves of immigrants, and
have had to assimilate the foreign born into the fabric of the urban
culture.
They have undergone drastic alterations in the composition of their
populations, as great numbers of the rural poor became urban poor,
replacing the wealthy and middle classes who no longer needed immedi-
ate proximity to the city's facilities.
The coming of the automobile has made their populations mobile.
Where a man works no longer determines where he must live. Where
*B.S. Journalism, University of Wisconsin, 1958; LL.B., Marquette University,
1963; Program Supervisor for Urban Renewal in the Department of City Re-
development, Milwaukee, and Staff Assistant to Mayor in Planning and Urban
Renewal. John T. Oswald, second year law student, assisted in the preparation
of this article through research and otherwise.
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a man lives no longer necessarily determines who he associates with
socially.
The Age of the Automobile has forced cities to spend ever greater
percentages of their revenues to servicing the machine-providing high-
ways, streets and parking to meet the unceasing demand of their mobile
citizenries.
And the freedom of movement basic to the automotive era has
contributed to an acceleration of blight in older urban areas. Neighbor-
hoods in transition are unstable. When ease of transportation allows
people to move out almost by whimsey, these neighborhoods are almost
totally unresistant to change.
Concomitant with the development of the automobile, the cities
have witnessed an amazing growth in the communications and trans-
portation technologies.
Location is no longer an overwhelming determinant of where par-
ticular businesses and industries must operate.
No longer can the cities take for granted the continued presence of
major industries, or assume a constant source of employment for their
people, or rely for their municipal budgets on the substantial taxes paid
by industry.
Instead, as their industrial plants have become obsolete, one industry
after another has abandoned the high-tax, high-wage Northern urban
areas to go where land is cheap and plentiful, and where a plentiful
labor supply will not be as demanding of wage increases and fringe
benefits as in heavily unionized cities.
Cities are finding themselves in a seller's market in dealing with
industry, and are being forced to aggressively compete with other areas,
to the point of offering subsidies, cheap land and other financial induce-
ments, to prevent industries from relocating.
While business and industry is becoming increasingly decentralized,
no longer bound to urban areas, the population as a whole is increas-
ingly urban.
While our historical ethos continues to be the ideal of individual
freedom and independence of action as exemplified by the sturdy
pioneer with all the rural virtues, we are fast becoming a nation of city
dwellers.' We are tied to and dependent on other city dwellers in a
complex system of economic and social relationships. We trust, for
almost all that is essential to life, to the vitality and health of the city
as an operating, functional organism.
lEach Federal Census since that of 1790 has shown a smaller percentage of
the total population to be rural and a larger percentage to be urban. In 1790,
5.3% of Americans lived in urban areas, while 94.7% were rural dwellers. In
1890, the percentages were 35.1% urban and 64.9% rural. In 1920, for the first
time, the urban population exceeded the rural, and the gap has widened since
that time until more than two-thirds of Americans now live in urban areas.
See R. 1fartin, THE CITIES AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 2 (1965).
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Most Americans who live and work in urban areas, however, can
no longer take the continued health of their cities for granted.
It has been apparent for decades that the vast, disruptive pressures
of the American experience has overwhelmed the cities.
They have been unable to adapt to change because the tempo of
change in America, spurred by the technological revolution, has far
exceeded the reaction time of municipal governments.
Confronted by urgent new demands unparalleled in urban experi-
ence, the cities have continued to function with traditional govern-
mental forms. They have operated under legal limits of authority ir-
relevant to the new problems. And they have largely been tied for their
revenues to a property tax system incapable of supporting the new
functions needed to adapt to change and to maintain the urban via-
bility.
As a result, major American cities from coast to coast are sick.
Many are in the age and decay stage of the life cycle. They suffer from
the cancer of urban blight. Like cancer, blight is a cannibal, infecting
and devouring healthy cells until it permeates the whole organism.
The most effective cure for blight and slums, just as for cancer,
is immediate excision through surgery, followed by preventive meas-
ures to prevent a recurrence.
Unfortunately, however, like many human victims of cancer, the
cities most afflicted with the cancer of blight and decay cannot afford
the cost of the cure.
To provide both the money and the mechanism of the cure itself,
the federal government through the years has appropriated funds and
enacted a series of programs aimed basically at restoring the health
of cities by treating physical blight and attendant human problems.
These programs are remedial, treating the overt symptoms of age and
decay. Their basis and approach are analogous to geriatric medicine,
specializing in the injuries and diseases of the aging and the aged.
These programs of "Urban Geriatrics" are necessary, because Ameri-
can cities are sick and old. They require the "medicare" of the federal
programs and money to combat their ailments.
The basic concept has been embodied in the Urban Renewal pro-
gram, rooted in the Housing Act of 1949.2 The program, now almost
eighteen years old, grew slowly in its early years.
Its recent growth, however, has been phenomenal. New programs
have rolled through the Congress with increasing rapidity, until major
new urban legislation is a yearly occurrence.
The boom started with the administration of President John F.
Kennedy. His "New Frontier" approach encompassed all aspects of
2 Ch. 338, 63 Stat. 413, (Codified in scattered sections of Titles 12 and 42,
U.S.C.).
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American Presidential power over national and international affairs,
with subject matter covering the spectrum from culture to economics.
There were those, however, even in the Kennedy Administration,
who insisted that the "New Frontier" really was focused on the cities
of America.
By 1960, about seventy per cent of Americans were urban dwellers. 3
No matter where they lived, they shared, in varying degrees, similar
problems.
Their downtowns were obsolescent, unable to meet the competition
of new suburban shopping centers, and no longer capable of meeting
the municipal demands for funds.
They were channeling huge portions of their resources into vast
expressway complexes merely to permit the survival of the city, and
yet demands engendered by the automobile made the expressways in-
adequate almost as soon as they were completed.
Their central city residential neighborhoods were sliding into decay,
becoming slums, while private capital looked elsewhere for investment
in residential construction.
Unchecked and uncontrolled urban sprawl was producing whole
sequential tract developments containing the built-in inevitability of
becoming the slums of tomorrow, as if some grand design dictated the
creation of a never-ending supply of blight.
Acknowledging these problems, the Kennedy Administration em-
barked on an urban program which accelerated sharply under the ad-
ministration of President Lyndon B. Johnson, aided by his extra-
ordinary rapport with the 89th Congress.
Some exciting, bold and dynamic programs have been proposed,
enacted and launched in recent years. Built upon the basis of the
Housing Act of 1949, they have been part of an evolutionary process
which shows no sign of abating.
This article does not propose to re-examine the legal and constitu-
tional basis for urban renewal. That municipalities possess the power
to undertake renewal projects, acquiring private property through
eminent domain and reselling the land for private development, is so
well-settled as almost to require no citation.4
Instead, the purpose of this article is to examine the evolution of
federal programs covering generally the redevelopment of physical
resources and rehabilitation of human resources in the nation's cities.5
In the course of the analysis, comment will be made on the practical
effect of these programs in meeting the problems they were purportedly
3 R. Martin, op. cit. supra note 1, at 3.
4 See David Jeffrey Co. v. Milwaukee, 267 Wis. 559, 66 N.W.2d 362 (1954).
See also Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
5 In developing the article, examples from Wisconsin law and the writer's own
experience in urban development will be used as illustrations.
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enacted to deal with. The new programs will be discussed in terms of
their potential impact on the cities and as to what they might fore-
shadow for the future.
As indicated, the basic constitutionality of urban renewal is rather
clearly settled. The growth of federal urban programs, however, has
raised a number of deeper, more subtle legal and constitutional ques-
tions.6
These questions affect the validity and integrity of traditional gov-
ernmental forms and spheres of responsibility. Because the federal
government has both developed the programs and made funds available,
a new federal-local relationship has emerged.
The role of state government in urban affairs has proportionally
diminished as Washington has bypassed the State House to deal directly
with City Hall. Unquestionably, the power of the federal government
over local activities has grown enormously as the cities have committed
themselves to programs and made themselves dependent on federal
money. The exercise of this power will contain major implications for
the survival of traditional forms of local government as we know
them.7 Recent legislation indicates what some of these implications
will be.
6 These questions, in the main, have not arisen as issues for judicial determina-
tion. They deal basically with the federal-local relationship, the disappearance
of local autonomy over local matters as an outgrowth of federal imposition
of national policy as interpreted by administrators onto local government as a
condition of financial aid, and the trend to minimizing the authority of state
governments over municipal affairs through use of contracts running directly
between federal agencies and city governments. Congress has not attempted
to force local governments to conform to national policy by legislative means.
Instead, a system has developed whereby the cities, once committed to the
federal aid programs, are in practicality constrained to accept contractual
conditions to the rendering of such assistance, which force the municipal
government to accept federal administrative policy determinations. The alter-
native facing municipal officials is economic disruption and political cata-
strophe.
7 Further, conditions for participation in new federal programs require cities
to promise services and guarantee the perfomance of functions which are
frequently, by local law and political organization, under the jurisdiction of
autonomous public and private agencies. For example, Milwaukee County
contains forty-six separate taxing units, many of them holding sway over
functions which must be incorporated into new federal programs. The question
is whether a city like Milwaukee, increasingly dependent on federal assistance
as problems grow more severe, can effectively guarantee the performance of
these functions while these agencies remain autonomous. In addition, munici-
pal government is bound and limited by state statutes and federal require-
ments are changing faster than the statutes can possibly be amended. A host
of American cities share the problems exemplified by filwaukee. And these
problems will intensify as cities begin to merge and cross state lines. The
problems of functional fragmentation and conflicts of state and local law are
not likely to be resolved; unless the basic existing governmental organization
is reappraised and a determination made as to whether traditional concepts
of intergovernmental relationships and powers are adequate in these days of
urban crisis and a decision reached as to whether artificial local political
boundaries, established helter-skelter as metropolitan areas grew historically,
ought to remain inviolate as central city problems increasingly become the
concern of entire regions.
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The federal laws pertaining to urban problems and particularly to
the renewal of our central cities have represented a significant evolu-
tion, a broadening of vision, which nevertheless has not quite kept
pace with the acceleration of the problems they were designed to meet.
There are two distinct groups of congressional enactments-those prior
to and those coming after 1960.
II. THE EARLY FEDERAL PROGRAMS
An ancestor of urban renewal legislation was the United States
Housing Act of 1937.8 That act was a depression measure-its basic
purpose was the provision of low-rent public housing. The 1937 Act,
however, went beyond the provision of subsidies for the construction
and maintenance of public housing-its full title was: "An Act to pro-
vide financial assistance to the States and Political Subdivisions thereof
for the elimination of unsafe and insanitary housing conditions, for the
eradication of slums, for the provision of decent, safe and sanitary
dwellings for families of low income, and for the reduction of unem-
ployment and the stimulation of business activity, to create a United
States Housing Authority, and for other purposes." The Act authorized
the taking of private lands for the then-questionable public purposes of
eliminating slums and constructing publicly-operated low-income hous-
ing on the lands thus obtained. Interestingly, litigation on the validity
of the public purposes involved resulted in precedents which, in some
states, were later heavily relied on by courts in upholding the still more
questionable public purpose in renewal legislation-the taking of private
lands for clearance and resale to a private developer. 10
As early as 1941, the need for a form of federal assistance to cities
for urban renewal and blight elimination was recognized. Legislative
proposals continued through the War years, despite the nation's total
commitment to military operations. In 1945, partly inspired by the acute
post-war housing shortage, a series of proposals was introduced into
the Congress. Interestingly, the Bills which finally resulted in the Hous-
ing Act of 1949, the foundation of the present Urban Renewal program,
were the work principally of Senators Wagner, Ellender and Taft, who
have come to represent widely divergent political and governmental
philosophies.1 '
The 1949 Act authorized Urban Redevelopment Projects, 2 and
many of its essential provisions remain in effect as part of the law
today. The Act permitted payment, by the Housing and Home Finance
Administrator, of two-thirds of the cost of Redevelopment Projects
8 Ch. 896, 50 Stat. 888 (1937) (Codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
9 50 Stat. 888 (1937).10 See Annot., 44 A.L.R.2d 1414 (1955).
11 For the legislative history of the Housing Act of 1949, see 1949 U.S. Code
Cong. Service 1550.
12 63 Stat. 416 (1949).
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undertaken by local public agencies.13 The projects involved acquisition
of private lands and their assembly into marketable parcels, clearance
of these parcels, and resale of the cleared lands to private developers,
at fair market values, for a re-use consistent with the "Redevelopment
Plan" for the areas.14
The program also provided for the advance of funds to cities for
survey and planning of projects.'5 Capital grants were conditioned
upon preparation of a Redevelopment Plan and approval of that plan
by the city's local governing body, Milwaukee's Common Council, for
example.' 6 A finding by that governing body that the Redevelopment
Plan was in conformity with the general plan for community develop-
ment (which general plan in most instances did not exist or was hope-
lessly outdated) was required.17 Any redeveloper was to be bound by
applicable provisions and restrictions in the plan. Those displaced by
the project had to be relocated in decent, safe, and sanitary housing at
prices they could afford.' 8 The local agency could proceed to acquire
land and exercise the power of eminent domain only after a public
hearing."
Despite frequent amendments to the federal housing legislation in
recent years, these requirements remain as part of the present Urban
Renewal program. They have become, however,-as have amendments
added to the program over the years-increasingly shrouded with an
overlay of administrative and procedural requirements. Applying for
Federal Urban Renewal assistance has become an exceedingly complex
process. The application itself is a two-part submission containing
greatly detailed technical and statistical data, as well as evidence of
compliance with legal and administrative requirements.2 1 Such applica-
tions take months to develop, process and submit. Once submitted,
federal technicians minutely review each part of the application for
compliance with procedural requirements, accuracy of representation,
legality of local actions, and discrepancies in statements of fact between
those contained in the application and any which might have been
made previously or collaterally.
The amount of correspondence and phone calls between a city agency
and the federal regional office concerning even purely mechanical ques-
13 63 Stat. 416 (1949), 42 U.S.C. §1453, as amended 42 U.S.C.A. §1453 (Supp. I,
1965), as amended 42 U.S.C.A. §1453 (Supp. 1967).14 63 Stat. 420 (1949), 42 U.S.C. §1460 (c) (1964), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §1460(c)
(Supp. I, 1965), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §1460(c) (Supp. 1967).
15 63 Stat. 415 (1949), 42 U.S.C. §1452(d) (1964), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §1452(d)
(Supp. I, 1965).
16 63 Stat. 416 (1949), 42 U.S.C. §1453 (d) (1964).
:'7 Ibid.
1s 63 Stat. 417 (1949), 42 U.S.C. §1455(c) (Supp. I., 1965).
19 63 Stat. 417 (1949), 42 U.S.C. §1455(d) (1964).




tions in an application is almost beyond comprehension. 2 ' The reviews,
the misunderstandings, the discrepancies are universally frustrating to
renewal administrators. They consume priceless time; they tie up a
city's resources in a particular project; they force the administrators
frequently to stand by helplessly, awaiting the federal go-ahead, while
the project area steadily deteriorates and the property owners' invest-
ments are jeopardized. 22
The programs and procedures emanating from the 1949 Act have
become increasingly bureaucracized. Federal administrators seem to de-
light in forcing compliance with the letter of the minutely detailed
regulations within their particular jurisdiction. Many of these require-
ments, viewed from the local end of the federal-local relationship, have
little bearing on the objectives of the project in question. 23 Neverthe-
less, producing a project meeting all requirements involves a period of
years in an area of activity aimed essentially at meeting the problems
of a given point in time. As a rule, these problems change markedly in
both degree and kind before the local community can get approval and
funds to proceed with the project. As an analogy, the situation is some-
what like that of a physician who discovers a localized cancer in a pa-
tient and begins treatment three years later. He knows the condition
cannot be any better, and he's reasonably confident that the cancer may
have spread, negating the effectiveness of a localized treatment.
21 For example, Milwaukee's Kilbourntown No. 3 Urban Renewal Project (Pro-
ject No. Wis. R-11) was first officially declared a project by the Milwaukee
Redevelopment Authority by its approval of the submission of an application
for Survey and Planning funds on December 14, 1960. Between that date and
May, 1967, approximately fifty official communications have passed between
the local agency and the federal government, plus uncounted unofficial letters,
phone calls and staff conferences. Almost seven years from the announce-
ment of the project, Milwaukee has not yet received Federal approval to begin
the actual purchase of property and clearance contemplated for the area.
22To illustrate the plight of property owners in project areas, Milwaukee
has undertaken a program of early purchase of some properties within the
Kilbourntown No. 3 Project, using city funds, to alleviate individual hard-
ships in specific instances. The experience has been that many of the properties
purchased have been bought for substantially less than the assessed value of
the property as reflected in the records of the City Tax Commissioner. Since
properties in Milwaukee are assessed at approximately 53% of their supposed
actual value, these property owners are receiving well under half the value
of their homes as determined by city assessments. Such is the condition of
the area that, for the most part, they are happy to settle for half.
23 For example, in the project described in notes 21 and 22, supra, the Govern-
ment imposed a condition of project approval which, in effect, required the
Redevelopment Authority to employ Negroes in responsible positions on the
agency's staff. The condition ignored the fact that the staff of the Rede-
velopment Authority is provided under contract with a city agency; that city
employees are almost invariably recruited and employed under the "merit"
or Civil Service system; and that the City of Milwaukee is an equal op-
portunity employer with a general policy of encouraging the employment of
Negroes. As a result of the Federal condition, a vast amount of time was
expanded in developing a procedure which would satisfy the federal officials




1954-The Addition of "Rehabilitation"
"Urban Redevelopment," with its sole reliance on slum elimination
through clearance of blighted areas and re-sale to private developers,
remained the only available federal tool until the passage of the Housing
Act of 1954.24 The major impact of the 1954 legislation was to add a
new approach to the problem of combatting blight-federal assistance
for the conservation of existing neighborhoods through the rehabilita-
tion of existing buildings. The concept was to treat an area before de-
terioration proceeded to the point where wholesale clearance became
necessary. The new approach was underscored by a change in termi-
nology. "Urban Redevelopment" was out, not only as too restrictive but
because it had developed some undesirable connotations from a public
relations standpoint. "Urban Renewal ' 25 was the new descriptive term
for the program, to illustrate the broadening of the program from slum
clearance to neighborhood conservation, to show the program's new
emphasis on areas which would not be acquired by government. Instead,
property owners would be assisted to improve their buildings and hope-
fully enhance the value and stability of their neighborhoods. The pro-
cedural requirements of the 1949 Act, with some minor amendments,
were grafted whole onto the new conservation portion of the Renewal
program.
An important provision of the 1954 Act imposed a major new re-
quirement on cities hoping to receive assistance under the Housing
Act. It established that no city could obtain a loan and grant contract
for a renewal project, until that city submitted to the federal govern-
ment a "Workable Program for Community Improvement." 2 This pro-
gram presently requires cities to submit annually a report of its acti-
vities in the following areas: 1) Codes and ordinances; 2) compre-
hensive community plan; 3) neighborhood analysis; 4) administrative
organization; 5) financing; 6) relocation; and 7) citizen participation.
The Workable Program not only establishes minimum standards in
each of these subject areas, it allows federal administrators to com-
pare progress from one annual submission to the next, and to enforce
improvements in local procedures by establishing conditions for suc-
ceeding submissions. A condition precedent for obtaining federal funds
for development now is a certification, or re-certification, of the city's
Workable Program as meeting the standards of the federal govern-
ment.2
7
Through the device of the Workable Program, the federal govern-
ment has forced its local governments to act in these enumerated areas.
24 68 Stat. 590, (codified in scattered sections of Titles 12, 20, 38, 40 and 42
U.S.C.).
25 68 Stat. 622 (1954).
26 68 Stat. 623, 42 U.S.C. §1451 (c) (Supp. I., 1965).
27 Ibd.
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Further, the requirements have periodically been strengthened. The
result is that local politicians are sometimes required to take actions
which might be politically damaging as an alternative to losing eligi-
bility for federal aid. Milwaukee has not as yet had a major problem
with compliance. Though the requirements have been aimed at estab-
lishing a local capability for effective utilization of federal aids and
generally have been successful, their presence has kept some cities
from urban renewal activity for some time .2
The basic Act of 1949 was amended from time to time prior to
the great upsurge in Housing legislation in the 19 60's. For example,
the Housing Act of 195629 authorized compensation, wholly federally
financed, for certain property losses and for moving expenses of per-
sons and businesses displaced as a result of an urban renewal project.30
The 1956 Act also authorized federal funding of the preparation of
General Neighborhood Renewal Plans, dealing with areas larger than
specific projects and requiring treatment over a period of years, but not
more than ten years (now eight years). 1 The GNRP was the first
legislative recognition of the need for long-range-as opposed to spe-
cific project-planning. It was followed in the Housing Act of 19593- by
authorization for funding, on a two-thirds Federal share basis, the
preparation of Community Renewal Programs (CRP's) . 33
The impact of the CRP provision has perhaps been greater in Mil-
waukee than in most other cities. Federal funds were used to survey
the entire community and to define a series of projects established on
a priority basis. Priorities were established, in large part, on a need for
the project as reflected in the degree of blight in the area; the City's
long-term financial capability to carry out a comprehensive renewal
program; and whether or not a strong market existed for resultant
cleared land, so that the City would benefit through replacing slums
with a higher land use, thus broadening the property tax base.3 4
The effect of Milwaukee's CRP has been to remove the question
of project designation and authorization, in large measure, from the
realm of local politics. In a form of government in which the real power
28 For example, the booming City of Houston, Texas, is one of the few major
cities not involved in programs administered by the Department of Housing
and Urban Development. The reason is that Houston has consistently con-
formed to a policy of free use and development of land as determined by
the market and has never adopted a zoning ordinance, which, of course, is
a Workable Program requirement.
29 70 Stat. 1091 (codified in scattered sections of Titles 12, 38, 40 and 42 U.S.C.).
30 70 Stat. 1100 (1956).
3170 Stat. 1099, 42 U.S.C. §1452(d) (1964), as amended; 42 U.S.C. §1452(d)(Supp. I., 1965).
3273 Stat. 654, (codified in scattered sections of Titles 12, 40 and 42 U.S.C.).
3373 Stat. 672 (1959).
24See Projects and Objectives, Milwaukee Community Renewal Program,
booklet of the Department of City Development, City of Milwaukee, 1964, as
revised in 1965 and 1966 annual legislative reviews.
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reposes with the Common Council, with individual aldermen possessing
virtual autonomy over what transpires in the wards which they repre-
sent, this is a major accomplishment. Without a Community Renewal
Program, a mayor at most possesses the veto power and his own talents
at persuasion and thus would be unable to develop a rational, long-range
developmental program in a city like Milwaukee.
The first decade of American urban renewal, therefore, provided
the basic tools and resources still most heavily relied upon by cities in
their attempts to attack blight. The experiences of cities in using these
tools, however, contrasted markedly with the lofty statements of Con-
gressional intent found in legislative preambles.
Some cities concentrated their resources in uprooting slums on a
wholesale basis. Many found that the displaced slum-dwellers auto-
matically moved to the cheapest housing, taking with them the living
habits common to a slum existence, and participating in the gestation
of a new hard-core slum area which would, in turn, require the mini-
strations of the bulldozer crews.3 5
Others found that, having cleared the slums, they were left with
vast urban wastelands which they were unable to put to an acceptable,
beneficial re-use. In their zeal to eliminate blight, they had neglected one
of the pre-eminent considerations in building a viable renewal program
-whether or not the cleared land could be sold to a private developer
for the re-use contemplated by the plan.3 6 Mayors, among themselves,
relate with distaste tales of political retribution wreaked at the polls
upon former contemporaries for creating these scenes of devastation
sometimes known as "The Hiroshima Effect."
Other cities, wary of the pitfalls in indiscriminate clearance, con-
centrated on selective clearance based primarily on whether a market
existed for a high-income, high-density re-use. These cities attacked
blight, provided it existed in or near the city's cultural, commercial
and economic center. They aimed at commercial renewal spurred by
relatively low land costs, or at middle to high-income residential de-
velopments, primarily luxury apartments. Their intent was to lure back
to the central city those people of "substance" who had long ago fled
to the suburbs. Their inducement was gracious, maintenance-free living
easily accessible to the center of vocational, cultural and social activities.
In many instances they succeeded, even though a curious situation
existed in which the government was attempting to bring middle-class
residents back into the central city by financing this sort of develop-
3 5 An example might be New York City. See "Let There Be Commitment", Re-
port of a Study Group of the Institute of Public Administration to Mayor
John V. Lindsay (Sept. 1966).36 Cleveland, Ohio, long ago embarked on a highly ambitious Urban Renewal
Program. Because that city has been unable to bring its projects to completion,
HUD recently withdrew fund reservations for Cleveland projects until im-
provement is demonstrated.
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ment through its Urban Renewal Program, while, at the same time,
the Federal Housing Administration in its mortgage insurance program
policies was making it easy for others of the middle-class to join the
suburban ranks.37
In concentrating on marketable, high-return renewal, however, many
of these cities neglected the more difficult and less lucrative problem of
preventing an acceleration of blight attributable in part to renewal
activities. Low-income housing razed to make way for a higher use
was not replaced with an equivalent number of standard housing units
for low-income families and individuals.
The cry began to be heard in the land with increasing loudness, as
militant minority groups increased in influence, that "Urban Renewal
is Negro Removal." It was charged that Urban Renewal, instead of
bettering living conditions for slum-dwellers, was reducing the supply
of housing available for low-income persons, creating ever-denser,
ever-more-compacted ghettos of the under-privileged. No city with a re-
newal program is totally free of this charge. New Haven, Connecticut,
for example, is generally considered to possess the most imaginative and
effective program for development in the country. Several of the in-
novative approaches worked out in New Haven have been incorporated
into the federal programs. Nevertheless, at a recent conference in New
Haven, the writer was greeted at the conference headquarters by a
group of pickets. They were bitterly protesting a proposed renewal
project because, they said, they had been uprooted, because of various
projects, as often as six or seven times in a short period of years. They
claimed that the area under consideration was the last bastion of housing
for the poor. They rejected housing alternatives worked out by the
city, stating they wanted to retain the power to choose their own hous-
ing free from governmental supervision; to live in a manner they
alone controlled. This occurred in the city which has, over the years,
received substantially greater federal monies, per capita, than any other
community, 38 a city whose programs for housing and social services
37 Until very recently, FHA regulations did not contemplate mortgage financing
for the renovation of existing homes in older areas of the central city. In-
stead, FHA mortgage insurance was basically available for new construction
and favored single-family residences rather than low-cost multifamily housing
available to the poor. Because land for residential development is available in
quantity only outside the central city, FHA programs of mortgage insurance
in effect encouraged those seeking new housing, and needing the backing
of FHA for financing, to go to the suburbs. Recent legislation, however,
indicates that the FHA will henceforth be a stronger force in the rehabilita-
tion and conservation of existing housing.
3s The Urban Renewal Directory of March 31, 1965, Bulletin of the Housing and
Home Finance Agency (Now HUD), Urban Renewal Administration, indi-
cates that New Haven, about the size of Madison, Wis., had committed a
total of about $55,850,000 in Federal Title I funds alone. In contrast, as of
that time, Milwaukee had committed approximately $36,908,000-and Milwau-
kee is about seven times the size of New Haven. Since that time, however,
the discrepancy has been reduced as Milwaukee's program accelerated.
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for displacees are held up as a national model of excellence. Ironically,
the residents' council behind the protest was organized and nurtured by
an agency of the city itself, in an effort to involve the area's people in
planning the proposed project.
Still other cities produced great tracts of low-income public housing
sprawling in great clusters like monstrous military barracks. While this
approach provided decent, inexpensive housing for great numbers of
slum dwellers, it, too, has been heavily criticized. Social scientists have
found that the slums, reprehensible as they are, maintain a strong
vitality as communities in which residents feel a sense of belonging. The
public developments, it is claimed, destroy this spirit of belonging,
leaving tenants even more alienated from community life than slum-
dwellers. 39 An apparent high incidence of unchecked criminality and
vandalism in the large public housing projects is cited as illustrative of
this alienation, and critics warn that a class of hereditary welfare clients
and public housing tenants will be created unless the residents can be
brought to participation in the mainstream of community life.
Some cities, of course, built strong and effective programs using
federal assistance, making inroads on slums, improving the economic
health of the city while doing much to solve the housing problems of
slum dwellers. These effective cities, as a rule, were notable for dy-
namic mayors with a solid political base within the city. They enjoyed
the support and participation of all segments of the city's power struc-
ture and a close rapport with the federal government, facilitating the
flow of funds.
40
In general, however, the record of Urban Renewal was considered
unsatisfactory in 1960. This attitude of dissatisfaction provided the
backdrop for the spurt of renewal and development legislation and
administrative changes which began with the Kennedy administration
and has continued to accelerate through the Johnson administration.
To 1960, the Federal programs were almost totally remedial in con-
cept. They aimed at defining blighted areas, documenting the degree
of blight within these areas, making application for federal assistance
primarily for clearance, and making an ultimate re-use of the land
consistent with a plan prepared by the community. Other than a re-
quired commitment from the community that decent, safe and sanitary
housing would be provided for relocatees, little attention was given to
39 See generally Jacobs, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES (1961),
particularly, Introduction and Cb. 15.
40 Examples are, notably, New Haven, Conn., where Mayor Richard Lee has had
the strong support of the electorate, the local legislative body, and Yale Uni-
versity, and has been able to exercise strong personal direction of the re-
newal program; and cities such as Philadelphia and Chicago, where elections
are partisan and the mayors head the local party apparatus and generally can
count on the strong backing of majorities of the local legislative bodies be-
longing to their political parties.
1967]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
problems of those displaced by the project. The process was (and
remains) time-consuming; the approach was static, dealing with blight
as if it were a constant.
In fact, blight is a dynamic, fluctuating phenomenon. Its spread or
containment is dependent on a number of variables, only one of which
is project activity designed to arrest it. The passage of years between
a project's inception and completion may see a change in circumstances
negating the intended effect of the project as slums develop in unfore-
seen directions and with unanticipated speed. 1960 witnessed the be-
ginning of a change in emphasis toward blight prevention based on
analysis of all possible variables. This has been a continuing evolu-
tionary change which is not only still in progress, but which is literally
almost daily taking on new dimensions.
III. THE FEDERAL PROGRAMS - 1960 TO PRESENT
Urban Renewal took hold in the first six years of the 1960's. It
became a commonplace instead of a rarity in municipal government,
and spread from the established major metropolises with established
major problems to small cities and even villages throughout the country.
While federal approvals and funds were relatively easy to obtain in the
early years of the program when participating cities were few and the
Federal Renewal agency was faced with the necessity of exhausting its
yearly budgets in order to justify continued Congressional appropria-
tions, the process became immeasurably more difficult as more cities
joined the program.41 Federal officials have become progressively more
selective in preliminary project approvals and more critical in their
scrutiny of technical and procedural requirements, from the inception
of planning through execution. They can now pick and choose from
a surplus of competing cities and competitive applications, and can
make a judgmental decision in approving fund commitments from their
relatively scarcer monetary resource. At the end of November, 1966,
the Department of Housing and Urban Development had available for
the remainder of the 1967 fiscal year, ending June 30, 1967, a total of
approximately $254 million available for Urban Renewal Capital Grants.
Applications pending before HUD totalled $1 billion 455 million.
42
No one has expressed any hope, either, that the flood of applications
will diminish or that Congress will augment appropriations to a degree
necessary to reduce the backlog. The federal administrators are there-
fore utilizing to the fullest the intricate and convoluted provisions of
their three-volume Urban Renewal Manual to screen their selections.
41 The Urban Renewal Directory of March 31, 1965, Bulletin of the Housing
and Home Finance Agency (Now HUD), Urban Renewal Administration,
lists 716 cities as participants in Title I projects.
42 NAHRO RENEWAL NEWSLETTER, National Association of Housing and
Redevelopment Officials, December 31, 1966.
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They are demanding of applicant cities compliance with these regula-
tions, and are imposing additional administrative requirements on the
cities in order to bring about closer conformity with their conception
of the legislative intent.43 Thus, cities must now provide detailed, docu-
mented, uncontrovertible proof that all families and individuals dis-
placed will be relocated in decent, safe and sanitary housing within the
limits of what they can afford to spend on housing."4 Families who
refuse relocation assistance must be tracked down with the dogged
persistence of a detective, their new homes inspected and, if they fail
to meet minimum standards, brought up to these standards by com-
pulsory legal process. In the flux of a clearance project, where it is
not uncommon for residents to make Midnight exits from rented pre-
mises to avoid back rent, it is often difficult to meet this requirement.
The Midnight movers seldom leave forwarding addresses.
As another example of the new selectivity, HUD recently, as a
condition of a project approval, required the Redevelopment Authority
of the City of Milwaukee to take steps to hire Negroes in responsible
positions on the developmental staff. The intent of the requirement is
reasonable and praiseworthy. Four or five years ago, however, such a
question would probably not even have been raised and certainly not
made an absolute requirement for approval.
It is possible that the new selectivity and the closer scrutiny being
brought to bear on applications for federal assistance may result in
better individual projects. It is also possible that the federal officials,
never known in their best days for the speed with which they processed
applications, will minimize the final impact of the project through
lengthening the period between project inception and execution.
Once a project is announced, a peculiar debilitating effect sets in
throughout the publicly-defined area. Despite strenuous efforts to con-
vince residents that the project is years in the future, tenants begin
moving out and owners are unable to find new occupants. Owners be-
gin neglecting the maintenance of their properties, on the assumption
that expenditures won't be recouped by a sale to the Renewal agency.
Vandalism begins in vacant buildings and, once started, accelerates
quickly. This "dead hand of urban renewal" falls heavily on property
owners in project areas. Their buildings steadily decrease in value as
the project area deteriorates. In many cases, the owners of habitable
4s The new administrative requirements are communicated to the cities in the
form of Local Public Agency letters, which are presently numbered in the
low 400's. These LPA letters explain new programs, but also clarify and,
generally, tighten up the requirements relating to existing programs.
44 For example, Milwaukee was recently compelled to re-submit an entire major
section on Relocation Resources for the project described in notes 21-23, supra.
In substance, the federal agency had rejected a source for estimates which it
had, quite recently, accepted virtually without question in applications con-
cerning two other projects.
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homes, after making mortgage payments for a number of years, have
received less for their properties from the Renewal agency than the
outstanding mortgage balances. A shortening of the tedious processes
involved in obtaining federal funds would do much to alleviate this
type of hardship. The federal government is moving toward eliminating
red tape in order to bring resources to bear on a particular area while
the project still bears some similarity to that described in the applica-
tion. The creation of the Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment by the Congress, at President Johnson's request, promises to be
an effective step in improving the procedures involved in Urban Re-
newal and making it more effective. 45 Further, since the creation in late
1965 of HUD as a cabinet department under a Secretary appointed by
the President, there has already been evident an emphasis on correla-
tion of hitherto independent programs to increase project effect. The
Milwaukee local agency is attempting to improve its internal procedures
and the statutes and ordinances governing its operations in an effort
to cut down local processing time.46
Surprisingly, shortage of funds and proliteration of regulations is,
to a certain extent, a peculiarity of the so-called "Title I" program-
clearance, conservation, or a combination of the two. These programs,
as indicated, date from the 1949 Act and its significant early amend-
ments. Most of the national experience has involved these programs.
Their approaches and procedures are tested and thus easy to adopt by
cities starting development programs. They therefore remain the stand-
ard definition of Urban Renewal and are the mainstay of the federal
program.
In the 1960's, however, and particularly in the enactments of
housing legislation in 1964, 1965 and 1966, the President and Congress
have provided a multitude of new tools providing new approaches in
the prevention of blight as well as additional muscle for the traditional
programs.
47
Among these new approaches are:
1. Federal participation, on a two-thirds basis, for concentrated
code enforcement in selected project areas. The local community com-
mits itself to bringing all buildings within the project area up to the
45 Department of Housing and Urban Development Act, 79 Stat. 667, 5 U.S.C.
§624 (Supp. I, 1965).
46See report, Administrative Streamlining of the Department of City Develop-
ment, prepared by the writer and introduced as Milwaukee Common Council
File No. 66-1814 on Sept. 20, 1966. Many of its recommendations have already
been adopted; others are pending.
4 Housing Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 769, (Codified in scattered sections of Title 12,
15, 38, 40 and 42, U.S.C.). Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965, 79
Stat. 451, (Codified in scattered sections of Titles 12, 15, 20, 38, 40, 42,-49,
U.S.C.). Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966,




standard established by the community's minimum codes, as well as
completing necessary public improvements and community facilities,
within a three-year period. This appears to be an extremely effective
preventive measure, operative in aging areas threatened by blight which
have not yet been seriously affected by decay and obsolescence. Milwau-
kee applied for and received federal approval for a large project cost-
ing nearly $6 million, of which the government will provide nearly
$4 million. The total process involved a matter of months, as con-
trasted with the years involved in a Title I project.4
2. Demolition of structures which, under state or local law, have
been determined to be structurally unsound or unfit for human habita-
tion. The federal government pays two-thirds of the cost of razing
such structures, and Milwaukee, with little difficulty, has received several
such demolition grants.49
3. Open space land and urban beautification and improvement
authorizing the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development to make
grants of fifty per cent of the cost of acquiring land for parks or open
space and fifty per cent of the cost of a total beautification program
for the community.50
4. Direct grants, one hundred per cent payable with federal funds,
to qualifying property owners in conservation or code enforcement
project areas to be used to cover the cost of repairs and improvements
required by applicable local codes or project standards. Such grants
are available to owner-occupants whose income does not exceed $3,000
per year, and may not exceed the lesser of the actual cost of the repairs
or $1,500. It is anticipated that this grant provision will be particularly
useful in alleviating hardships imposed on elderly project residents who
may subsist on a fixed income which would not permit the making of
necessary repairs.5'
5. Rehabilitation loans, at an interest rate of three per cent and
covering a long term, for property owners in conservation and code
enforcement project areas. Loans are made directly to eligible property
owners by an agency of the federal government. It is expected that the
rehabilitation loans will be particularly useful in instances in which
owners do not qualify for or cannot obtain conventional financing to
undertake necessary repairs or improvements. 52
48 See Milwaukee Common Council File No. 66-332, which contains local legisla-
tive approval for submission of application and execution of grant contract
for Milwaukee Code Enforcement Project 1-a (Federal number Wis. E-1).
49 79 Stat. 477 (1965), 42 U.S.C. §1467 (Supp. I., 1965).50 79 Stat. 496 (1965), 42 U.S.C. §1500c-1 (Supp. I., 1965) ; 80 Stat. 1280 (1966),
42 U.S.C.A. §1500c-2 (Supp 1967).5179 Stat. 457 (1965), 42 U.S.C. §1466 (Supp. I., 1965).




All of these represent a departure in basic conception from the
traditional renewal programs exemplified by the Title I clearance pro-
ject. They enable cities to focus resources in areas threatened by blight,
but not yet qualifying for the surgery of Title I action. They represent
an attempt to anticipate and prevent the spread of blight. A concerted
use of these programs would enable a community to remove isolated
buildings constituting a blighting influence in a neighborhood; bring
the remaining structures up to minimum code standards and maintain
them as decent, safe and sanitary housing; assist property owners in
paying for necessary improvements to alleviate possible financial hard-
ship; provide open space and park lands where needed to adequately
serve the neighborhood; and install necessary public improvements and
neighborhood facilities to bring the aging neighborhood to an approxi-
mate equality with newer areas.
Most importantly, federal money is available with encouraging
promptness and a minimum of red tape, enabling project execution
with a reasonable expectation of achieving the effect contemplated when
the application was submitted. Cities have not yet responded to these
programs with the enthusiasm with which they are embracing Title I
approaches, and HUD has not yet shrouded the new programs with a
protective wrapping of regulations.
These programs offer evidence that the federal government is shift-
ing from a static, remedial approach to a dynamic, anticipatory pre-
ventive attack on urban problems.
Additional evidence, however, is provided by recent shifts in emphasis
in federal programs for low-income housing. Institutional public hous-
ing erected and managed under the jurisdiction of a local housing
agency is being de-emphasized. Instead, recent enactments offer strong
inducements for private developers to participate in providing neces-
sary housing for low-income families and individuals.
The controversial "rent subsidy" provisions of the 1965 Housing
Act,53 for example, authorizes the Secretary of HUD to make supple-
mental rental payments to non-profit or limited dividend housing owners
who develop housing available, at low cost, to disadvantaged persons.
The amount of the supplemental payments may not exceed the differ-
ence between one-fourth of the tenant's income and the fair market
rental for the dwelling unit.5 4 In effect, this program offers the dis-
advantaged family or individual, who would previously have been
forced to rely on public housing for decent housing, to choose privately-
sponsored housing. It is thus possible to avoid any stigma which may
attach to public housing. In fact, the tenant's neighbors, who may be
paying full rental, need not even know that a federal supplement is
5379 Stat. 451 (1965), 12 U.S.C. §1701s (Supp. I, 1965).
5479 Stat. 452 (1965), 12 U.S.C. §1701s(d) (Supp. I, 1965).
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involved, since, in theory, the program is designed to bring the dis-
advantaged back into contact with other elements of a city's society.
After a struggle in Congress over whether funds would be provided for
the program, it is now underway on a pilot basis in many cities.
Other provisions authorize local housing agencies to contract with
owners of existing housing developments for use as public housing and
for the use of existing structures, including one- and two-family resi-
dential buildings, as individual public housing units.55 Local agencies
may acquire or lease these existing buildings and may rehabilitate them.
The effect of this program, if emphasized at the local level, is to dis-
perse public housing tenants throughout the community in residential
areas and to expose them to the influence and opportunities available
to them as part of a healthy neighborhood.
It should be noted that housing philosophy is not the only reason
for these departures from practices established by the venerable 1937
Act. The federal government has learned, as have the local housing
agencies, that private developers or owners of existing housing can
provide comparable housing units at far less cost per unit than those
built under the aegis of the local authority. Because private contractors
need not follow the cumbersome bidding, bonding and contracting re-
quirements legally imposed on the public agencies, privately-developed
public housing costs less per unit and goes up faster than housing built
by a governmental agency.
The composite effect of the new renewal and housing techniques
is, however, philosophical-to focus more attention and resources on
preventing the spread of blight and on solving housing problems of
disadvantaged and minority groups.
Model Cities
If any doubt remained as to the direction of development programs
under the Johnson Administration, it should have been thoroughly
dispelled by the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development
Act of 1966.6 The new legislation not only represents a departure from
the traditional Title I programs, but departs substantially from the
existing concept of Urban Renewal as concerned exclusively with
the physical regeneration of American cities. The 1966 Act holds out
the inducement of substantially augmented federal funds plus sub-
stantially increased local discretion in the use of the additional funds.
On the other hand, participation in the program would exact from the
local communities a commitment to provide facilities and services which
are commonly dispersed among several distinct and autonomous agencies
55 79 Stat. 455 (1965), 42 U.S.C. §1421b (Supp. I, 1965), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A.
§1421b (Supp. 1967).




of government. To effectively meet this commitment could conceivably
necessitate a basic reappraisal of the structure of local government it-
self, and the relations between various governmental bodies.
57
The effect of the new legislation is to shift emphasis from individual
projects to vast sections of cities. Within these "model neighborhood
areas," participating cities must focus all available federal, state and
local programs on all the problems of the entire area.
No longer will the planners concern themselves only with structures
while agencies concerned with other aspects of a community's prob-
lems works each in his own sphere of action, antiseptically isolated
from the operations of the others.
Instead, the "Model Cities" program requires that unified programs
be developed for attack on all the disparate conditions which contribute
to building slums.
The requirement sounds simple, but the implications are staggering
both in terms of impact on the organizational structure of local com-
munities and in the extent of the departure from the traditional ap-
proach.
These implications can best be illustrated through a description of
the Department of Housing and Urban Development's standards for
participation in the program.58 The program should be comprehensive.
By "comprehensive"HUD means that the program content should be
aimed at: a) rebuilding or revitalizing large slum and blighted areas;
b) expanding housing; c) expanding job and income opportunities; d)
to reduce dependence on welfare; e) improving educational facilities
and programs (emphasis added); f) combating disease; g) reducing
crime and delinquency; h) to enhance recreational and cultural oppor-
tunities; i) establishing better access between homes and jobs; and j)
improving living conditions for people who live in the Model City area.
HUD states that an illustrative program designed to meet this
"comprehensive" standard might contain these elements :59
A physical improvement component ranging from new streets, side-
walks and the like, through new parks and recreational centers, to new
and better facilities and commercial establishments.
A housing component to meet all housing needs, but emphasizing
low and moderate-income housing.
A transportation component encompassing not only traffic patterns
and arteries within the area, but designed to also provide area residents
57 See notes 6-7, supra.
58 IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF URBAN LIFE, A Program Guide to
Model Neighborhoods in Demonstration Cities, U.S. Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD PG-47) (Dec. 1966).
59 Id. at 8-11.
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access to community-wide employment, shopping a n d community
facilities.
An educational component, aimed particularly at the educational
needs of the poor and disadvantaged.
A manpower and economic development component, to develop
commerce and industry within the area and to create job opportunities
for residents, particularly the poor and underprivileged.
A recreational and cultural component, to provide a broad range of
opportunities designed specifically for the interests, taste and abilities
of area residents.
A crime reduction component, which should prevent and control
crime, but should also rehabilitate criminals and delinquents and mini-
ster to employment, educational and recreational needs.
A health component to make a comprehensive health service easily
accessible and available to all project residents.I A social service and public assistance component, encompassing such
inclusions as legal aid, consumer counseling, planned parenthood, credit
assistance and the like.
It is an impressive list of activities to be focused and coordinated
in one area to meet all aspects of blight, in its human, physical and
economic manifestations.
It should be noted that, in most cities and certainly in Milwaukee,
as many independent agencies as there are components exert jurisdic-
tion over the various program elements. These agencies act autono-
mously within their individual areas of operation. Since an effective
marshalling of all of these programs would require at least an un-
precedented degree of cooperation and probably the creation of some
central authority with jurisdiction over all these agencies, the difficulty
of creating a "comprehensive" program is apparent. Agencies and
bureaucracies reserve their greatest zeal for defending their prerogatives
and jurisdictions.
HUD, however, further emphasizes that this is merely an illustra-
tive list, and warns that a city demonstration program should not be
a "mere packaging together of existing plans and programs . . .- O
Participating cities must thus not only invade the established domains
of existing agencies, but must also seek basic changes in the nature of
the programs administered by these agencies.
HIUD stresses variety and innovation in demonstration programs,
going beyond existing programs and policies, and tailored to the specific
needs, problems and resources of individual cities.
In marked contrast of the leisurely approach which has been charac-
teristic of preceding programs, the Government is now stressing speed.
60 Id. at 10-11.
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In an obvious attempt to complete the treatment before the disease
spreads, HUD is allowing only one year for planning and five years for
execution of this massive, many-faceted new program. G1 Putting a pro-
gram together which meets the standards of comprehensiveness and
offers some possibility of accomplishment in the given time period is
a staggering task.
In Milwaukee, for example, a Model Cities program could encom-
pass up to 80,000 people-meaning a commitment to rebuild an area
containing more people than any Wisconsin city other than Milwaukee
and Madison while at the same time solving all the human problems
of its inhabitants.
The "comprehensive" standard, moreover, is only one of many the
Government expects participating cities to meet. For example:
1. Administrative machinery must be established which will guaran-
tee the ability to carry out the program on a consolidated and coordi-
nated basis. In-Milwaukee-and in most cities governed by traditional
rules of state and municipal law-this requirement means that a "City
Demonstration Agency" must have some authority over those tradi-
tionally independent and autonomous agencies jealous of their jurisdic-
tion. In Milwaukee, these agencies would basically include City govern-
ment, the County Board of Supervisors, the Milwaukee Board of School
Directors, the governing board of the Vocational and Adult Schools,
the private health and welfare agencies who have a vested interest in
the problems of the underprivileged, plus state agencies and civic
associations.
2. The program must make a "substantial impact" on physical,
economic and social problems in the area, establishing "lasting solutions"
in the model area and, in addition, elsewhere in the city.
3. Blight should be arrested or removed in the area, and the pro-
gram should be of sufficient magnitude to substantially benefit the city
as a whole.
4. The program should make "marked progress" in reducing social
and educational disadvantages, ill health and underemployment. It
should provide social services needed by the poor and disadvantaged
and should make possible widespread citizen participation in planning
and carrying out program components.
Again, the Government is demonstrating its new awareness that
slums are not defeated by tearing down buildings, because a "slum"
is a composite of variable factors which include human and economic
factors as well as structural conditions. It is becoming accepted that
slums do not cease to exist, but merely move spatially, as displacees
move, unless the slumdwellers are renewed along with the buildings.
6180 Stat. 1256, 42 U.S.C.A. §3303 (Supp. 1967), and note 58 supra, at Pt. Ill,
Sec. 0, pp. 17-18.
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5. The program should contribute to a well-balanced city with a
substantial increase in the supply of standard housing of low and mod-
erate cost.
The problem of housing displacees has long been a major area of
delinquency in Urban Renewal. By generally tightening up relocation
standards, and incorporating this program requirement into current
Title I projects, the Government is attempting to guarantee an adequate
supply of housing for displacees, particularly the poor, as an integral
part of any physical renewal effort-6 2
6. The program should contribute to a well-balanced city with
maximum opportunities in the choice of housing accommodations for
all citizens of all income levels.
This requirement concerns itself with assurances of an adequate
housing supply to meet all needs-the location of available housing
within and outside (emphasis added) project areas, and the city's ap-
proaches for making housing available to all citizens and all income
levels (emphasis added).
The implications of this requirement have caused apprehension and
consternation among development administrators, mayors and local
officials.
Some have interpreted it to mean that participating cities must
have in effect an "Open Housing Ordinance" guaranteeing freedom
of housing opportunity throughout the city to minority groups. One
Mid-South city recently has proposed such an ordinance specifically
to qualify for consideration as a Model City.6 3
HUD officials have denied, in conversations with the writer, that an
ordinance, per se, must be in effect if the city is to qualify. They stress,
however, that a city's record in the field of minority group housing is
an important factor in meeting this standard, and that participating
cities should be prepared to represent thaf all citizens, including Negroes
and other minority groups, will have an opportunity of choice in housing
consistent with their income levels.
When this requirement is considered together with the previous
standard involving increased supplies of low and moderate-income
housing,it is apparent that one of the intended objectives of the Model
Cities program is to break down long-established racial barriers in
housing. This interpretation is buttressed by the strong federal sug-
gestion that families and individuals relocated as a result of the pro-
gram, in particular, be given a choice of a variety of decent standard
accommodations, at rents or prices they can reasonably afford, in an
area free of blight.
62See Local Public Agency Letter 395.63That ordinance, introduced in Louisville, Ky., was subsequently rejected by




Slum or blighted areas requiring clearance are commonly occupied
by large minority group populations. They have gravitated to these
blighted areas, forced there by economic pressures and the unavailability
of minority housing elsewhere. Because, almost as a matter of defini-
nition, areas already heavily occupied by minority groups do not meet
the relocation standard of being blight-free, compliance with this re-
quirement will necessitate a dispersal of non-whites through areas
which have been traditionally white, wherever the available housing
supply dictates. A city may not relocate displacees into a ghetto.
It is ironic that the same Congress which failed to enact a federal
law on equal housing opportunity should have approved the Demon-
stration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966. The Act
authorizes potentially greater federal control over the sale and rental
of private housing than that contemplated in the general federal meas-
ure, at least as far as participating cities are concerned.
7. The program should contribute to a well-balanced city with
adequate public facilities (including those needed for education, health
and social services, transportation and recreation), commercial facilities
adequate to service the residential areas, and ease of access between
residential areas and centers of employment.
In amplification, HUD states that the quantity and quality of facili-
ties serving the model neighborhood area should be comparable to those
available in other parts of the city and metropolitan area (emphasis
added). Adequacy of facilities should also be judged, it is stated, in
terms of the expressed needs and desires of residents of the area.6 4
Having disposed of the problem of segregated housing in the pre-
vious section, the Government now turns to a consideration of in-
equalities in public facilities. It should be noticed that, buried in the list
appears a requirement regarding educational facilites, and that area
residents should be heeded as to their preferences and stated needs.
Possibly, any practic bearing a resemblance to so-called "de facto
segregation", including the maintenance of schools with predominantly
Negro student bodies, and the bussing of intact classes from central
city to outlying schools, could be interpreted by HUD as a failure to
meet this condition, particularly when brought to the Government's
attention by organizations of area residents. Of particular interest is
the use of facilities throughout the metropolitan area, though beyond
the municipal boundaries, as a standard of comparison by which to
judge the adequacy of project facilities.
Schools in project areas will, in all likelihood, suffer by comparison
with comparable suburban facilities. The suburban residents may be
willing to spend perhaps twice as much for a high school plant and
program, for example, than a city school board, with limited tax and
84 Note 58, supra, at Part III, Sec. K, p. 16.
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bond revenues, can afford. In any event, it seems possible that those
civil-rights oriented groups concerned with Negro-White educational
disparities may gain increased stature and impact in communities parti-
cipating in the Model Cities program.
8. The program should insure that substantive local laws, regula-
tions and other requirements are or can be expected to be consistent
with the objectives of the city demonstration program.
This requirement goes to the validity of established laws and pro-
cedures of local government. Participating cities must be prepared to
alter these laws and procedures whenever it appears they might be
inconsistent with program objectives. Building, housing and zoning
regulations, tax assessment policies, and public housing and welfare
regulations are open to close scrutiny under the requirement. In addi-
tion, cities must represent that they will attempt to remove state and
local laws or charter provisions presenting legal obstacles to the achieve-
ment of program objectives, a task which involves merely the persua-
sion of legislatures frequently dominated by rural interests and rela-
tively unconcerned with meeting federal requirements.
The standards go on to outline a number of specific additional cri-
teria for participation, posing additional problems of varying degree
for cities hoping to be selected for the program.
Common to all of the program standards, however, is a require-
ment that neighborhood area residents be brought into full participation
in the decision-making process. It is safe to assume that area residents
will exert more authority in city government than do city dwellers
generally. Participating city officials must consider the possibility that
area inhabitants, with federal enco.uragement and funds, may develop
into strong political forces which could work against the established
regime.
From the foregoing analysis of the impact of the program standards
on community practices and institutions, however, two basic facts
should be apparent:
1. The Demonstration Cities program is ambitious, almost grandi-
ose in concept, going far beyond any previous federal programs in
impact and providing a mechanism for focusing all existing aid pro-
grams in a unified, coordinated manner aimed at revitalizing whole
great segments of American cities. In essence, the program is remini-
scent of the "new towns" approach utilized in England, except that it
aims at building basically new communities within the framework of
existing cities and at renewing human as well as physical resources.
2. The Demonstration Cities program apparently intends to im-
pose national goals upon participating local communities, in such areas
as housing, education and intergovernmental cooperation as a condition
of receiving federal assistance. It has perhaps been decided that the
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method in which the cities have used existing programs has not been
notably successful in coping with the problems of blight, growth and
change which are a national urban condition.
The government, therefore, seems to have made a drastic reversal
of position. In the old programs, objectives were a matter of local dis-
cretion, while procedures and technicalities were rigidly specified by the
federal agencies. In the new program, HUD is listing stated objectives
and is not only permitting but actually encouraging experimentation
in developing new procedures to accomplish them. Local government,
however, no longer has unlimited latitude in determining what those
objectives should be-the objectives must reflect and include those
elements the Government has built into the program if a city is going to
participate.
Given the sweeping nature of the requirements for selection as a
Model City, and the potentially explosive political consequences which
could flow from an attempt at compliance, it would hardly appear likely
that elected political leaders would view the new program with any-
thing but suspicion and even reluctance.
Surprisingly, however, the major cities of America are vigorously
competing to be selected as Model Cities. The reasons, the writer
thinks, are at least two. First, elected officials in big cities these days
are more competent and more concerned with solving the problems of
their communities than in probably any other era with the possible
exception of the Republic's infancy and the incumbencies of the Found-
ing Fathers. A modern mayor (and Milwaukee's present mayor, Henry
Maier, is regarded by analysts of government and by his peers as an
outstanding example of the new breed) is not only aware of the prob-
lems, but is dedicated to solving them, disregarding day-to-day political
consequences. The day of the machine-made mayor and the wardheeler
has largely gone by the boards in the United States, rendered obsolete
by the dissolution of the old, party faithful ethnic groups and by the in-
creasing complexities of administering a municipal corporation.
Second, and most importantly, the Government is holding out as an
inducement to participation an unprecedented amount of money, with
an unprecedented freedom from attached strings, to communities which
succeed in meeting the primary requirements of Model Cities programs.
The basic percentage of Government participation in federally-
assisted programs is maintained. For example, the federal share of
project costs in urban renewal, neighborhood conservation and con-
centrated code enforcement is two-thirds. In open-space land acquisi-
tion, it is fifty per cent. In Community Action programs under the
Office of Economic Opportunity, the current percentage is ninety per
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cent, to be reduced to eighty per cent for the new fiscal year com-
mencing July 1, 1967.65
If projects such as those listed above were components in a Model
Cities program, the federal government will pay an additional amount
of up to eighty per cent of the total non-federal share of the project
cost.6 6 The eighty per cent ratio is not mandatory. Instead, building in
another element of control to assure compliance with the national poli-
cies, the percentage of the supplemental federal grant is flexible, deter-
mined in part by the number and intensity of economic and social pres-
sures in the Model neighborhood.
One of the most significant elements in the new supplemental grant,
to the writer's mind, is the fact that supplemental funds are not ear-
marked for specific purposes. They are not dependent on the nature of
the expenditures upon which the supplement is based as a determinant
of how the additional money may be spent.
Thus, assuming that urban renewal provided the basis for ninety
per cent of the supplement, and recreation only ten per cent, and the
amount of the supplement was $1 million, it would be within the dis-
cretion of the program's local administrative agency to spend all or
any part of the supplement for recreational facilities, without providing
any additional local money, as long as the recreational facilities were
part of the approved comprehensive program.
To provide some idea of the magnitude of the inducement to parti-
cipate, consider the effect on Milwaukee: Five urban renewal projects,
as currently outlined, will cost the City an estimated $19,998,000 as its
local one-third share of project costs. Assuming that these same pro-
jects were Model Cities components, Milwaukee's administrative agency
could receive a supplemental Federal grant of approximately $16 mil-
lion to be used in any eligible area of activity, provided the maximum
eighty per cent was used.
The program therefore contemplates significant sums which would
not possibly be raised by tapping the already abused property tax which
is the basic source of revenue of a city like Milwaukee. Further, this
money can be spent in programs aimed at treating problems which might
otherwise be ignored because of competing needs for city resources.
So the situation is this: aware that compliance with all the objectives
of the new program will possibly involve a disruption of the operations
and jurisdictional responsibility of local government and an upheaval
of the established community social organization, the cities and their
political leaders simply cannot afford to cut themselves off from a major
no-strings source of funds. The power of the purse, therefore, is being
65 80 Stat. 1462 (1966), 42 U.S.C.A. §2788(a) (Supp. 1967).
6680 Stat. 1257 (1966), 42 U.S.C.A. §3305(c) (Supp. 1967), and note 58 supra
at Pt. IV, pp. 21-23.
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applied to impose federal standards and requirements on the local com-
munity and, like it or not, the cities must adopt these standards as a
condition of sharing in the pie.
Communities deciding that more money does not justify the required
sweeping commitments face these alternatives:
It is possible that funds authorized for existing programs will be si-
phoned off to finance projects submitted as Model Cities components,
creating shortages for non-participating cities. HUD officials have de-
nied that this will occur, but it seems unlikely that the Administration
would allow a shortage of money to jeopardize success of a program
to which it is as heavily committed as Model Cities.
Further, top federal administrators have made it clear that the 1966
legislation is their proposed model for all future programs. It is possible,
then, that avoiding participation in the Model Cities program will mere-
ly postpone the time when similar requirements will be imposed as con-
ditions of federal assistance.
On the other hand, it is within the realm of possibility that the
recently elected Congress may refuse to fund the program, or that the
1968 elections may produce a change in administrations leading to mod-
ification or abandonment of the program. Should the latter occur, cities
might find that they have spent a great deal of time and money toward
an unproductive end. Further, commitments or controversial require-
ments, unless counterbalanced by substantial inflows of federal money,
are fraught with political peril for the mayors and city councilmen who
must make the final decision.6 7
Cities, therefore, are caught in a basic dilemma: In seeking the
augmented resources which may make possible a real impact on major
community problems, they risk a cataclysmic disruption of the local
status quo. It has been said that:
Indeed, one suspects that the real meaning of the demonstra-
tion cities program is that, far from being 'coordinated' with
other programs, it is to be a challenge to them-an effort to
create a new slum policy that will . . . put social goals ahead of
67 The risk that adequate funds will not be provided to carry out the program
is very real. The change in the complexion of Congress resulting from the
1966 elections reduces the Administration's chances of obtaining major ap-
propriations on domestic programs, particularly while the Vietnam conflict
continues to require massive financial support. Further, the cities have tradi-
tionally received short shrift from Congress on appropriations as compared
to other programs. In 1965, for example, only $557 million went to all munici-
palities from the federal government-less than one-half of 1% of total federal
spending. In contrast, in the same year, we spent more than $5 billion, or
nine times as much, just on the space programs! Query: Does this represent a
"massive assault" by the richest nation on earth against one of its most serious
domestic problems? See "The Financial Plight of the American City," an
address by Reuben A. Zubrow, professor of economics at the University of
Colorado, presented at the Colorado College Symposium on "The City,"
Colorado Springs, January 10, 1967.
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physical ones, and thus put a new urban political coalition (the
poor, the intellectuals, and bureaucrats now struggling for power)
into opposition with the old coalition (downtown businessmen,
mayors, and bureaucrats already in power).Gs
In pursuing the potential benefits of Model Cities participation, those
who make decisions in cities are thus providing a basis of strength
around which may jell an "opposition coalition" aimed at turning out
the incumbents.
IV, CoJNCLUs soN
The development of federal programs aimed at local urban problems
has been an evolutionary process. To an increasing degree, the programs
have created direct relationships between the cities and the federal gov-
ernment. The power of state governments in municipal affairs has dimin-
ished as federal influence has grown.
The basis for the rise of federal involvement in local government
has been a recognition that the problems of cities are national prob-
lems, that cities throughout the nation share similar ailments. In devel-
oping programs to treat these ailments, the government has, in effect,
superimposed national goals and objectives onto the structure of mu-
nicipal government.
These goals and objectives have grown in scope as the programs
have evolved; in their fullest expression to date, in the Demonstration
Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966, they have encom-
passed almost every significant area of local government.
Participation in the Model Cities program necessitates, willy-nilly, a
surrender of local autonomy to the extent that federal requirements
must be met in developing program components. It need hardly be men-
tioned that the list of components covers virtually every function of
local government and disregards local political organization which
spreads these functions over several autonomous agencies.
Of course, participating cities are required to meet the federal
standards only in the Model City area. If programs are developed
which meet the requirements, however, it is unreasonable to assume
that they will not be applied throughout the community. Few cities will
be able to maintain separate administrative mechanisms, with all the
bureaucratic complexities involved, for Model City areas and the rest
of the community.
While ostensibly a method of coordinating existing programs to
maximize their effect, "Model Cities" is actually a totally new concept
in the federal approach, breaking with the methodology developed over
the years since the 1937 act establishing public housing and the 1949
legislation creating urban renewal.
68 "The War on Cities," James Q. Qilson, Department of Government, Harvard
University, in THE PuBmC INTEREsT (Spring, 1966).
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Implicit in the new concept is the recognition that the cities have not,
in utilizing the traditional programs, contributed to the solution of na-
tional urban problems.
Indeed, urban renewal has been a rare creature in the nature of its
public acceptance: attacked by the political right as a federal "giveaway"
creating further inroads by "Big Government" into local autonomy and
private property rights, it has at the same time been attacked by the
left as suppressive of minority rights and an instrumentality of exploi-
tive use of local resources, with governmental sanction, by the "estab-
lishment."
The new program will certainly not allay the criticisms of the right.
Instead, it seems to represent a federal alignment with the position of
those critics who have held that renewal has ignored the drastic social
effect on the community created by displacement of slumdwellers. It
represents an agreement that urban renewal, even when it has created
"civic centers," luxury apartments and municipal monuments to prog-
ress, has failed to do anything to prevent a recurrence of slums.
Accordingly, Model Cities forces participating cities to give at least
equal emphasis to human renewal as to physical renewal. It compels
the cities not only to analyze and describe human problems as they
exist, but also to make some determination as to why they exist. Pro-
posed solutions are thus supposed not only to alleviate the existing prob-
lem, but also to prevent its recurrence as well.
Meeting these requirements and objectives entails a massive com-
mitment for most American cities, a commitment which, because it
crosses jurisdictional and territorial boundaries, cannot be fulfilled by
any one agency or unit of government working alone.
Balancing the commitment, however, is the promise of huge infu-
sions of federal money to achieve the goals of the program.
Urban scientists have long advocated a system of "block grants,"
in which the federal government would forget the traditional project
approach and let cities spend money where, in local judgment, it is
most needed. For a variety of reasons, not least of which was political
opposition to the creation of financial ties between incumbent federal
administrations and metropolitan population centers governed by poli-
tical machines, the idea has never received serious consideration.
The supplemental grant provisions of the Model Cities program are,
however, a form of block grant. The monies can be spent as determined
locally, providing the expenditures are consistent with program objec-
tives. The cities have long maintained before Congress that their in-
ability to provide solutions to urban problems is a result of lack of
money. They have claimed that existing programs limit the manner in
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which federal funds can be used, and have not contributed to easing
local resource shortages.
Participants in Model Cities will have the opportunity to demon-
strate the effectiveness of local control over expenditures in attempting
to achieve stated goals.
Further, the Government has committed itself to making available
a formidable arsenal of federal aid programs to Model Cities programs.
The Department of Housing and Urban Development, in its Program
Guide, lists forty-three separate federal grant-in-aid programs with
local matching fund requirements." All of these are eligible as elements
in a local Model Cities program. In using these programs, cities are
promised a diminution of the procedural red tape required for programs
on a project-by-project basis, and are encouraged to develop combina-
tions of programs to maximize impact on specific problems.
If the government follows through in obtaining appropriations for
supplemental grants, and if the federal bureaucracy can work together
to make the full range of programs available as Model Cities compo-
nents, a possibility exists that visible results will be produced within
the five-year execution period set up by the legislation.
The availability of these resources, however, must be an absolute
fact before it can be established that the "rhetoric gap" has been over-
come in this bold new approach. In recent years, one of the more tire-
some of clichfs has been the "gap" syndrome. We have had a "missile
gap" and a "credibility gap," for example. Washington pronounce-
ments and declarations of purpose are giving rise to yet another of the
genre-the "rhetoric gap." It may be defined as the fluctuating but ever-
present gulf between the rhetoric of urban problems and the resources
available to meet those problems.70
Even assuming major Congressional appropriations, administration
of the program from the federal end poses organizational problems the
equal of those facing the cities. The forty-three existing aid programs
are dispersed among no less than seven cabinet departments plus certain
executive agencies.
While a concentration and coordination of these programs is an in-
tegral element in the new approach, the administration of the new pro-
gram must be grafted upon an assortment of entrenched bureaucracies.
The working agencies are each directly responsible to a member of the
Cabinet. They will predictably be reluctant to surrender any portion of
69 Note 58, supra, at Appendix B, pp. 44-45.
70 In the report noted at note 35, supra, Edward J. Logue, perhaps the pre-
eminent renewal administrator in the country, estimated that it would cost
approximately $1.5 billion in federal funds to put a program together which
might possibly handle New York City's problems. Such a sum is not likely to
be available as long as the disparity between agriculture and space spending,
and urban expenditures continues to exist. See also note 67, .epra.
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their authority to HUD, which will be generally responsible for Model
Cities. In this situation, only the President himself has the power to re-
solve conflicts. It is questionable whether he can devote any consider-
able portion of his attention to resolving jurisdictional conflicts, while
he is yet concerned with such unrelated matters as the Vietnam war and
upcoming national elections.
Despite the tremendous obstacles to making Model Cities successful,
however, the program stands as the first major attempt to work with
basic causes, rather than outward effects, of urban problems. It is the
first recognition of the desperate need, in cities throughout the nation,
for vastly increased resources. It is the first federal attempt to provide
more money without encumbering grants with stringent restrictions on
how the money may be used.
As implied earlier, the administration means to make this program
in fact what the name implied-a model which will determine what ap-
proach the federal government will take in future urban programs. HUD
Secretary Robert C. Weaver and Assistant Secretary Robert C. Wood
both indicated, at a conference with big-city mayors attended by the
writer, that Model Cities was intended to set the pattern, in approx-
imately fifty selected cities of varying sizes and characteristics, for fu-
ture programs which would entail comprehensive attacks on urban
problems as a condition of federal financial help.
It is a reasonably safe assumption that the 1966 legislation does not
constitute a final stage in the evolution of federal programs. What comes
next will, in large measure, be determined by the impact of the Model
Cities program. Certain likely areas of activity, however, are already
apparent. Among them are:
1. Substantial changes in the organization of local government and
major realignments of traditional functions exercised by various agen-
cies of local government, including suburbs, counties and school boards.
2. The extension of concepts and requirements developed in Model
Cities beyond project boundaries and even beyond municipal boundaries
to create programs metropolitan in scope.
As outlined, the Model Cities program primarily is confined to the
model neighborhood, spills over in some respects to the city generally,
but stops abruptly at municipal boundaries. It recognizes, for example,
that the confinement of minorities and the poor in ghettoes results in
the creation of successive generations of the perpetually underprivileged
users of community resources rather than contributors to urban health.
The program therefore attempts to break traditional housing pat-
terns, certainly in the model neighborhood, and to a certain extent within
the city generally. It makes no provision, however, for helping low-in-
come members of minority groups achieve a choice of housing extend-
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ing to suburban areas. In this respect, the program will not allow the
cities to shift part of the burden of providing health, welfare and crime
prevention costs to the entire metropolitan region which depends, for
its existence, on the health of the central city.
A growing weight of opinion, however, holds that entire regions
must be involved in minority housing problems.7'
Cities complain bitterly about suburbs which, through stringent zon-
ing and building regulations, effectively establish an insurmountable
price barrier to Negroes who might wish to move beyond the city limits.
Mayors have pointed out that the middle-class exodus to the suburbs,
coupled with in-migration of the rural poor, could create central city
ghettoes surrounded by islands of prosperity. When property tax reve-
nues can no longer provide the municipal services required by the un-
derprivileged, it is contended, the illness of the central cities will become
terminal. And the suburbs, they state, cannot exist without a healthy
central city.
Minority housing policies developed as part of the Model Cities pro-
gram, therefore, may one day conceivably be extended to apply through-
out metropolitan areas.
The 1966 legislation, in fact, takes the first steps toward metropoli-
tan approaches to certain problems. The Act authorizes grants to agen-
cies carrying out metropolitan development projects, primarily involving
public facilities.7 -
It would seem, however, that additional funds will not be sufficient
to induce the suburbs to make any significant surrender of local munici-
pal control over major programs.
It has been noted that:
One would guess that many suburban communities would
willingly sacrifice grants for sewer, water, schools, parks, and
other facilities to avoid pressures to accommodate low income
families of any sort or Negroes of any income. They can afford,
for the present, to provide their own good schools and otherwise
mediocre services, and to defer for the next generation the prob-
lem of equity for others. 3
In any event, it is probable that new legislative programs based on
Model Cities experience will be dynamic in nature. They will be aimed
71 But it is universally recognized that massive action in central cities alone
cannot solve the problems produced by urban decay, racial discrimination,
overcrowding, and the decentralization of industrial jobs. Only metropoli-
tan action can open up the housing market so that low income and minor-
ity workers can follow new industry to the suburbs, thus freeing central
cities to engage in humane forms of needed reconstruction.
William L. C. Wheaton, Director, Institute of Urban and Regional Develop-
ment, University of California, Berkeley, in THE JOURNAL OF THE AmERiCAN
INSTITUTE OF PLANNERS 368 (Nov. 1966).
72 80 Stat. 1263 (1966), 42 U.S.C.A. §3335 (Supp. 1967).
73 Id. at 369.
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at preventive action based on calculation of probabilities. Already, the
sophisticated technology developed by the space program is being
adapted to coping with urban problems. It is a virtual certainty that
this will continue, and that, as cities become metropolitan and then de-
velop as megalopolis, the approach foreshadowed in the Model Cities
program will be utilized to resolve the problems inherent in population
growth and continued urbanization.
The development of cities into metropolises is an established fact.
The further evolution of the metropolis into the megalopolis is gener-
ally regarded as inevitable as population grows. Evidence exists that the
age of megalopolis is already here, in the East Coast urban complex
running from Boston to Washington; in the Midwest, where Detroit,
Chicago, and Milwaukee are extending tentacles of growth toward each
other; and in the chain of cities spanning the California coast. 4
Urban communities are already superseding artificial political boun-
daries and will continue to do so as the urban centers become even
greater.
Lines of traditional functional authority scattered among existing
political institutions are becoming blurred and indistinct as federal pro-
grams impose new responsibilities on the cities. This breakdown of local
governmental organization will continue as megalopolis develops.
Urban problems are being magnified by the development of megalop-
oli-they sprawl over political boundaries and are incapable of any
real solution by any single municipal entity. Transportation, for exam-
ple, must be dealt with on at least a regional basis to be at all effective.
Even though the cities and countryside have been covered with layers
of concrete and labyrinthine interchanges, freeways have not been able
to loosen the traffic noose which chokes the great cities. Average free-
way speed in some cities at rush hour is a bit slower than the pace of
horse-and-buggy travellers of more than half-a-century ago.
The central city of today represents the functional heart of the de-
veloping pattern of megalopoli. That heart is presently demonstrably
diseased. If the central city is to effectively support the complex urban
network surrounding and dependent on it, the responsibility for keeping
it healthy must be borne by the entire region. Unless programs are ex-
tended throughout the region, following the tendency implicit in recent
federal legislation, it is doubtful that the great cities will survive as we
have known them. They cannot continue to serve as the economic and
cultural hub of a vast region while at the same time housing increasing
percentages of the poor, the unemployed, the minority groups. They
cannot continue to provide necessary regional services-hospitals, the-
7 See generally Doxiadis, Urban Renewal and the Future of the American City,
Public Administration Service (1966).
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atres, libraries, museums, etc.-from a dwindling property tax base, a
tax base which becomes even smaller as the cities become ghettoes of
the poor surrounded by unconcerned and uninvolved suburbs.
Existing urban programs, up to the 1966 legislation, have not pro-
vided mechanisms for treating problems as regional concerns, rather
than as the exclusive province of the cities, confined within municipal
boundaries.
Further, they have operated after the fact, aimed at areas which
were already slums. Until the Demonstration Cities act, little real em-
phasis was given to the basic causes of slums or to the identification of
factors involved in their creation, in order to prevent the rapid growth
of the cancer that is blight.
The Model Cities approach is the first major attempt to put together
a program of preventive action aimed at reaching the basic causes of
physical and human blight. It appears likely that the concept will be the
pilot for future federal programs which will, in addition, treat the prob-
lems of cities as the problems of entire regions supported by the cities.
